11-11-2026

Data Analytics, Data Analytics and AI, Economic Analysis and Research, International Development, R-Programming

The rule of law and economic growth: what three decades of data show

Weighted by population, the rule of law has slipped globally since 1996. India and the United States contributed a large part to this decline, while China’s net impact was negligible thanks to a recovery from the mid 00’s. Countries with a stronger rule of law tend to be wealthier, and those where it improved were more likely to grow faster, but there are plenty of exceptions to the rule, with China experiencing higher growth than might be expected from changes in its rule of law score, alongside Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana and Myanmar.*

Intro

TLDR: Weighted by population, the rule of law has slipped globally since 1996. India and the United States contributed a large part to this decline, while China’s net impact was negligible thanks to a recovery from the mid 00’s. Countries with a stronger rule of law tend to be wealthier, and those where it improved were more likely to grow faster, but there are plenty of exceptions to the rule, with China experiencing higher growth than might be expected from changes in its rule of law score, alongside Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana and Myanmar.

How AI was used: AI was used to write the first draft of analysis included in this post. I then collaborated with AI to refine the post until it resembled what I had in mind: the majority of writing is therefore my own. AI also was used to put the post in a format compatible with WordPress.

Background

One of the reasons consulting suits me is that it provides me with an almost unlimited number of rabbit holes to get lost in. One such example that came up in 2025, was a project exploring the links between economic growth and the rule of law for the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and the Law Society of England and Wales. If you’re interested in exploring this further, I’d recommend Dr Lopez-Gomez’s literature review, which was a key outcome of the project.

This is the fourth post in my series on the rule of law (see earlier posts: 1, 2 and 3), with previous posts intended to demonstrate themes that this and future posts rely on, including that:

  • The Worldwide Governance Indicator’s (WGI) Rule of Law index provides a reliable proxy for the World Justice Project’s (WJP) measure (with greater coverage over a longer period); and
  • It’s probably not a good idea to solely use pairwise relationships for exploring how the rule of law interacts with other outcomes as these things are hard to measure, co-determined and probably operate within an interdependent system of institutions.

Four themes

Although I had grander plans when I first started drafting this post, I’ve scaled back my ambition to focus on four themes that provide useful context for future posts:

  • Globally, the rule of law has deteriorated since the mid 90s.
  • Countries with stronger rule of law are wealthier.
  • Countries that improve their rule of law tend to grow faster.
  • But, the rule of law isn’t a necessary or sufficient condition for economic growth.

Here be dragons

To avoid the need for weasel words and vague descriptors it’s worth remembering that cross-country analysis is a minefield:

  • Institutions like the rule of law (etc) are hard to define and measure: Institutions are the rules, norms and conventions that shape, constrain and guide human behaviour and interactions. Institutions can run from the grand rules and expectations that ensure peaceful democratic transitions after an election to the mundane social norm that ensures Bill from Accounting doesn’t microwave his tuna salad at lunch. Whether the former is more important than the latter is a matter of taste, but being all encompassing, interdependent and hard to define also makes institutions difficult to measure. This is particularly true for perception-based measures as someone asked how well the rule of law works is likely to be thinking about democracy, accountability and government effectiveness too, while potentially making qualitative judgements that lean towards accepted Western models of governance.
  • Interesting things tend to be correlated with one another: As institutions like the rule of law operate within an interdependent system (see last post), everything tends to be correlated with one another whether or not they are causally related. Economic growth probably depends on the quality of a country’s legal system, but the legal system itself likely also depends on economic growth too as it influences the resourcing available for government to invest in it. This makes it difficult to talk about the rule of law as a discrete characteristic independent of other institutions.
  • National statistics obscure the relationships that matter: Cross-country statistics are not always representative of specific actors or the underlying causal mechanisms that we’re interested in. For instance, economic and social relationships sometimes transcend the nation-state (the unit of focus for cross-country analysis).
  • Institutions are sticky and slow moving: We consider a time series of data running from 1996 to 2023, which is just short of three decades. Although this might feel long-run enough, leading studies in the field cover much longer periods e.g. 100+ years (see 1 and 2). In practical terms, this might mean that the strength and direction of relationships examined here might not generalise over longer periods.

But, I haven’t picked the themes covered here by accident: each of them tells a story supported by the literature, which I’ve done my best to cite throughout.

Project setup

Data

The rule of law measure is the Rule of Law dimension of the World Bank’s WGI, 2025 release, which covers 1996 to 2024.1 The WGI’s RoL attempts to measure the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts and the likelihood of crime and violence. The WGI’s measure has been selected on the basis of it covering a larger number of countries over a longer period. Earlier posts in the series also indicated it provides a reliable proxy for the WJP’s more comprehensive RoL measure. The data can be downloaded here.

Statistical measures, namely GDP per capita (PPP), GDP per capita growth, population and oil and gas rents, along with each country’s World Bank region, have been drawn from the World Development Indicators via the wbstats package. They were downloaded once, on 22 October 2026, and saved, so the results don’t change when the World Bank revises its figures. A snapshot of the data used here can be downloaded here.

Country income classifications were the earliest classifications available from the World Bank’s historical classification data (available here).

Pacific island small states are the World Bank’s group of that name, taken from its current country classification file (CLASS.xlsx, downloaded on 7 November 2026 from the same page).

Access to the sea, as the share of each country’s population living within 100 km of a coast or a navigable river, and the malaria index came from the geography dataset of Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger,2 downloaded on 7 November 2026 from RePEc.

The four code chunks below are used for loading libraries, specifying key assumptions, and importing and joining the data.

Code: setup

The code below loads the libraries, sets key assumptions and defines standard chart styles and labels for the rest of the post.

Importing data

Code: import-wgi

The code below imports the WGI and recodes countries so they align with the World Bank data.

Code: import-wdi

The code below imports the WDI data and the World Bank’s historical income classifications.

Each country is grouped by its earliest World Bank income classification to avoid the groups directly mirroring rule of law scores i.e. due to simultaneity between economic growth and the rule of law. This isn’t a perfect solution, but will have to suffice in the absence of an instrument.

# A tibble: 4 × 3
  econ_income_start   econ_hic_start          n
  <chr>               <chr>               <int>
1 High income         High income            54
2 Low income          Low & middle income    51
3 Lower middle income Low & middle income    78
4 Upper middle income Low & middle income    40

Code: join

The code below joins WGI and WDI datasets into a single panel dataset. Countries that failed to join are listed, as are countries scored in 1996 whose first income classification came later.

# A tibble: 9 × 2
  iso3c country                      
  <chr> <chr>                        
1 GUF   French Guiana                
2 MTQ   Martinique                   
3 TWN   Taiwan, China                
4 AIA   Anguilla                     
5 ANT   Netherlands Antilles (former)
6 REU   Réunion                      
7 COK   Cook Islands                 
8 NIU   Niue                         
9 JEY   Jersey, Channel Islands      
# A tibble: 4 × 4
  iso3c country econ_income_start   econ_income_start_fy
  <chr> <chr>   <chr>                              <int>
1 NRU   Naoero  High income                         2017
2 PLW   Palau   Upper middle income                 1998
3 SRB   Serbia  Upper middle income                 2008
4 TUV   Tuvalu  Lower middle income                 2011

Global rule of law trends

To get a sense how the rule of law has changed, the code block below calculates the average rule of law score since 1996 across countries. Both unweighted and population-weighted scores are calculated, with the latter indicating how the rule of law has changed for the average person.

Note: Revisions to the WGI’s methodology in 2025 improve the ability for scores to be compared over time (see the World Bank’s methodology note, cited in the Data section above).

Code: population-weighted-trends

The code below calculates the global unweighted and weighted rule of law score. Only countries with WGI scores in the first year are included so the number of countries remain fixed.

The rule of law has declined globally

The chart below presents weighted and unweighted rule of law scores since 1996. Unweighted scores can be thought of as how the rule of law has changed for the average country, while the weighted scores are intended to show how it has changed for the average person. In both cases the rule of law appears to have declined globally, although the declines in unweighted scores only just clear the measurement error bands.

Note: Shaded bands are based on the standard errors provided by the WGI and can be thought of as margins of error. In their note on analytical issues with the WGI, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi suggest that overlapping intervals can be thought of as a conservative test for whether two scores are the same.3 And while the generalized declines might be cause for alarm, the population-weighted fall of 0.22 is smaller than the 0.31 difference in scores between Denmark and New Zealand in 2023. This doesn’t mean that the changes aren’t significant from a governance standpoint, but just that the scale of these declines doesn’t necessarily point to the world becoming lawless.

Figure: World Rule of Law, population-weighted and unweighted, 1996–2023

Code: plot-world-trend

The code below produces a plot with the weighted and unweighted rule of law score since 1996. The shaded bands are based on 90 percent margins of errors provided by the WGI. The contributions to the average world score change is also estimated in dta_country_contrib, and the five most populous countries are picked out for the text and charts below.

India was a key driver of global declines in the rule of law

Population-weighted average rule of law scores mean more populous countries with larger score changes drive the global average. The code below explores this by looking at the source of declines, with a focus on the five most populated countries (accounting for 46% of world population).

The answer is mixed, with India, the United States and Pakistan experiencing declines, Indonesia an improvement and China showing next to no net change. Although India experienced smaller declines relative to the United States and Pakistan, its larger population made it a key driver of declines in the global weighted average rule of law score.

When each country’s score is viewed individually, the trends aren’t as clear cut. For instance, although India’s score has declined over the period, the change is within the bounds for measurement error, making it possible that score differences come down to measurement error rather than tangible changes in institutional quality (which is also true for China). On the other hand, the trends exhibited by the United States and Indonesia are large enough to point to real changes over the period: a decline for the former and improvement for the latter.

Figures: Rule of Law in the five most populous countries, 1996 and 2023, and in every year between

Code: world-trend-contributions

The rule of law scores for the five most populous countries: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the United States are then visualized. The first plot shows the change in the WGI RoL score between 1996 and 2023, while the second plot shows how each country’s score has evolved over time, as a smoothed line with uncertainty bands.

Rule of law scores fell across the majority of region and income groups

To get a sense of just how global these global averages are, the next figure presents average population-weighted score changes by region and income classification from 1996 to 2023. Each panel is a region and each arrow is an income group within it. The thin line over each arrow is the 90% measurement error band. Error bands crossing zero point to the direction of change in the rule of law being ambiguous.

Overall, countries across almost all regional and income groups experienced declines in their rule of law scores. The exception to this was in East Asia and the Pacific, where three income groups improved, though only one by more than the measurement error bands: the upper middle income group of South Korea, Macao and Palau. The general declines also line up with analysis by the World Justice Project, which found that countries with declines in their rule of law scores outnumbered those with improvements for nine years in a row.4

Note: A population-weighted decline doesn’t mean most countries got worse as more populous countries might be driving it (such as India in the chart above).

Figure: Change in population-weighted Rule of Law by starting income group within each region, 1996 to 2023

Code: plot-arrows-region-income

The code below calculates the population-weighted average for each income group within each region, in 1996 and 2023, and plots the change with a 90% measurement band. It also counts the falls that are clear of their band.

Countries with stronger rule of law are richer

You don’t need to be an economist to guess that the rule of law is probably stronger in richer countries5, but scatter plots demonstrating this appear in almost every governance report talking about the rule of law. The plot below demonstrates this by comparing each country’s rule of law score in 2023 with its GDP per capita. Purchasing power parity (PPP) terms are used to adjust for differences in purchasing power, such that one PPP dollar has the same real value across countries.

The line on the plot shows the typical relationship between the rule of law and average income. Countries to the left of the line are poorer than might be expected given their rule of law scores, while those to the right of the line are wealthier. Although why countries sit on either side is a rabbit hole worth exploring, a large share of the outliers can be explained by geography and the structure of a country’s economy, in particular:

  • Countries that are wealthier than might be expected given their rule of law score: include economies that rely heavily on oil and gas rents, which is theorised to reduce the incentive for government to create inclusive institutions for the benefit of the wider public.6
  • Countries that are poorer than might be expected given their rule of law score: include a large share of Pacific island economies and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the reasons are beyond the scope of this post, Pacific island economies are unusually small and remote, depressing economic activity and trade, while many of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa face wider institutional and geographic challenges, such as poor governance and having a smaller share of their population near navigable rivers.7

As always, my point here isn’t to imply the two things are causally connected as the claim requires more evidence than a pairwise correlation. But, the idea that more secure, predictable and legible property rights might make trade and commerce easier isn’t new, which means there’s plenty of evidence exploring the idea.8 It’s also a compelling idea to anybody who has spent their career being inundated with governance reports presenting the correlation.

But, there’s also an arguable conceptual endogeneity9 between GDP per capita and the rule of law. The rule of law plays a central role in deciding what can be owned, priced and traded, while also being shaped by the same political and economic forces it is meant to govern.10 So by strengthening the rule of law, what can be owned, priced and traded changes too,11 thereby expanding what can be counted in GDP statistics. That doesn’t make the connection meaningless as GDP is connected with other things we care about like life expectancy and wellbeing. But it’s good to keep in mind as it’s likely that some part of the correlation reflects their overlapping and mutually reinforcing scope, rather than simply being a clean relationship between two independent variables.

Note: Oil and gas rents are the value of oil and gas production less what it costs to extract, as a share of GDP, from the World Development Indicators.

Code: levels-data

The code below produces a scatter plot comparing a country’s rule of law score with GDP per capita in 2023. The size of each country’s point is scaled by population, while economies with significant oil rents (>10%), Pacific island small states and Sub-Saharan African countries are coloured.

But economic growth without the rule of law exists

Almost every discussion of the links between institutions and economic growth eventually turns to China. China, so the story goes, has grown quickly without investing in pesky institutions like the rule of law.12 This section tests that story in two steps: first by comparing growth with where countries started on the rule of law in 1996, and then by comparing growth with how their rule of law changed over the period.

The plot below shows the distribution of average GDP per capita growth from 1997 to 2023, with countries grouped into four groups based on their rule of law score in 1996. It’s as good a time as any to repeat the warning about drawing sweeping conclusions from observational analysis like this, but the data suggests two things about economic growth and the rule of law:

  1. Strong growth is possible where the rule of law is weak: many of the countries that started with weak scores grew faster than those that started with strong ones; and
  2. A strong rule of law doesn’t guarantee high growth: the countries with the strongest rule of law scores in 1996 had the lowest median growth of the four groups.13

Note: Most of the countries in the strongest quarter were already high income at the start of the period, and richer countries tend to grow more slowly, partly because they have less room to catch up.

Figure: Average growth 1997–2023 by Rule of Law in 1996

Code: plot-growth-vs-start

The code below calculates the average annual economic growth and presents this as a histogram with countries grouped according to their rule of law score in 1996.

# A tibble: 4 × 8
  start_quarter start_quarter_label  nmb_countries nmb_high_income growth_median
          <int> <fct>                        <int>           <int>         <dbl>
1             1 Weakest quarter of …            48               0          1.89
2             2 Second-weakest quar…            48               0          2.31
3             3 Second-strongest qu…            48               5          2.01
4             4 Strongest quarter o…            47              31          1.29
# ℹ 3 more variables: growth_sd <dbl>, growth_p10 <dbl>, growth_p90 <dbl>

Countries where the rule of law improved were more likely to grow faster

The histogram above looked at growth against a country’s level of rule of law in 1996. The plot below looks at growth against the change in its rule of law score between 1996 and 2023.

In essence, it asks whether countries whose rule of law improved more also grew faster. The answer is a qualified yes, and the relationship is positive in every region with enough countries to measure it.

This isn’t to say that improvements in the rule of law cause economic growth14, only that the two have moved together over the last three decades. Causality could run the other way, with faster-growing countries able to spend more on the courts, police and other systems that support the rule of law, or it could run both ways. Other drivers of growth may also be missing from the analysis, such as the quality of regulation and political accountability, which are closely tied to the rule of law. Even so, the pattern helps explain why economists are so excited to talk about how and why the two might be linked.

The plot also highlights countries that grew faster than might be expected given changes in their score. China, the example that everyone raises, is there but isn’t alone: Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Myanmar, Armenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all sit well above the line with no clear change in their rule of law score. Several have likely explanations, such as oil discoveries, economic recovery after war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union. China’s small change over the period also hides a fall in its score in the mid-2000s which was followed by a long recovery. None of this is to deny that China holds lessons about institutions and growth (it does), only that it’s not the only outlier that’s worth explaining.

Note: North America showed the opposite relationship but is left off the regional chart, as it has only three countries (Bermuda, Canada and the United States).

Figures: Change in Rule of Law and average growth, 1996–2023, for all countries and by region

Code: plot-growth-vs-change

The code below produces two plots: a scatter plot comparing economic growth with changes in the rule of law, with the unusually fast growers whose score didn’t clearly change named, and a bar plot that reports the correlation between the two variables within each region.

# A tibble: 1 × 3
  region        nmb_countries cor_change
  <chr>                 <int>      <dbl>
1 North America             3     -0.943

Summing up

The point of this post, besides satisfying my curiosity about the data, was to lay out a set of common themes that emerge in the literature:

  • Globally, the rule of law has deteriorated since the mid 90s;
  • The rule of law and economic growth appear to be linked;
  • The rule of law’s relationship with economic growth is positive across regions; and
  • The rule of law isn’t a necessary or sufficient condition for economic growth.

If you’re familiar with the field, none of this will be particularly surprising, but each of these themes provides useful context for future posts where I attempt to tease out some of these relationships and trends in greater detail. But, I also wanted to make a contribution to the grey literature on the topic as from my observations there are few explorations of the topic that dig into the technical details outside published papers on the topic.


  1. World Bank (2025). “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: revised methodology for measuring governance using perception data.” December 2025. Prepared by C. N. Jiang, A. Jain, T. Romano and T. Boyce.↩︎

  2. Gallup, J. L., Sachs, J. D. and Mellinger, A. D. (1999). “Geography and economic development.” International Regional Science Review 22(2): 179–232.↩︎

  3. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010). “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: methodology and analytical issues.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5430.↩︎

  4. World Justice Project (2026). WJP Rule of Law Index 2026. Washington, DC: World Justice Project. Released 21 October 2026. worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index↩︎

  5. Analysis also points to the correlation becoming stronger over time, see: Bhagat, S., 2020. Economic growth, income inequality, and the rule of law. Harvard Business Law Review Online.↩︎

  6. Natural Resource Governance Institute 2015, The resource curse: The political and economic challenges of natural resource wealth , NRGI Reader, viewed 7 November 2026, resourcegovernance.org.↩︎

  7. Distance from the sea and access to inland rivers may also play a part. Countries where fewer than a quarter of people live within 100 km of a coast or navigable river are mostly poorer than their score predicts (many of them are in Sub-Saharan Africa). I tested this using Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger’s geography data (RePEc), but left the analysis and grouping off the chart as it largely picks out countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and I didn’t want to imply there was a simple explanation for something this complicated. In my defence, I’m in good company: Adam Smith argued that water transport widens markets and Jeffrey Sachs and co-authors make a similar case for navigable water, see: Mellinger, A.D., Sachs, J.D. and Gallup, J.L., 1999. Climate, water navigability, and economic development. CID Working Paper No. 24, Center for International Development, Harvard University.↩︎

  8. For instance, see: Rigobon, R. and Rodrik, D., 2005. Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income: Estimating the interrelationships. Economics of transition, 13(3), pp.533-564; Haggard, S. and Tiede, L., 2011. The rule of law and economic growth: where are we?. World development, 39(5), pp.673-685; and Butkiewicz, J.L. and Yanikkaya, H., 2006. Institutional quality and economic growth: Maintenance of the rule of law or democratic institutions, or both?. Economic Modelling, 23(4), pp.648-661.↩︎

  9. In addition to the statistical endogeneity, such as wealthier nations being more able to invest in their legal and regulatory systems.↩︎

  10. e.g. see: Krever, T., 2011. The legal turn in late development theory: The rule of law and the World Bank’s development model. Harv. Int’l LJ, 52, p.287; and Haggard, S., MacIntyre, A. and Tiede, L., 2008. The rule of law and economic development. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 11(1), pp.205-234.↩︎

  11. Pistor makes a similar point in her book ‘The Code of Capital’, noting that: the law allows the attachment of “…wealth generating attributes, namely priority, durability, convertibility, and universality onto different assets.” See: Pistor, K., 2019. The code of capital: How the law creates wealth and inequality. Princeton University Press.↩︎

  12. For a good overview of why it’s thought China has achieved this, see: Lopez-Gomez, L. (2026) The Rule of Law and the Institutional Roots of Economic Performance: Literature Review. London: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and the Law Society of England and Wales. Available at: https://binghamcentre.biicl.org/publications/the-rule-of-law-and-the-institutional-roots-of-economic-performance, p.17↩︎

  13. The non-linear relationship between the rule of law and other institutional variables is well-documented, e.g. Beyaert, A., García-Solanes, J. and Lopez-Gomez, L., 2023. Corruption, quality of institutions and growth. Applied economic analysis, 31(91), pp.55-72.↩︎

  14. This isn’t to say evidence doesn’t exist: for instance, Besley et al. (2025) found that areas in England with greater legal capacity during the industrial revolution achieved better social, economic and institutional outcomes. Because it’s plausible that legal capacity has been exogenously determined, the authors believe the association can be interpreted as being causal. See: Besley, T., Bogart, D., Chapman, J. and Palma, N., 2025. Justices of the peace: Legal foundations of the industrial revolution (No. 20214). Centre for Economic Policy Research.↩︎

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For people who read the footnotes. Occasional posts on data, analytics and public policy.